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CHAPTER 9
Per Argumentum a Fortiori
Alina Miron*
§9.01 INTRODUCTION
Argumentum a fortiori is shrouded in mystification.1 It looks like Latin, yet the Latinists
warn it is incorrect, scholastic Latin.2 It is said to designate a logical and legal
argument, yet it lost this specificity to enter the common language and the ordinary
dictionaries. The Latin phrase is translated as meaning: ‘even more true’, ‘by even
greater logical necessity’, ‘with even greater force’, ‘all the more’, ‘for an even stronger
reason’, ‘à plus forte raison’, ‘a maggior ragione’, ‘con mayor razón’. The Oxford
Dictionary defines it as a ‘[phrase] used to express a conclusion for which there is
stronger evidence than for a previously accepted one’,3 while the Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary considers it is ‘used in drawing a conclusion that is inferred to be
even more certain than another’.4 The French dictionary of reference, Le Petit Robert,
defines it as ‘En concluant de la vérité d’une proposition à la vérité d’une autre pour
laquelle la raison invoquée s’applique encore mieux’.5
Law dictionaries define a fortiori as ‘a term used in logic to denote an argument
to the effect that because one ascertained fact exists, therefore another, which is
* The author would like to thankMarie Lepelletier, student in the LLM programme of the University
of Angers, for the help she provided with research on the case law and with the formatting of this
contribution.
1. In full, it should actually be a fortiori causa/ ratione.
2. Jacques Cellard, A priori et a fortiori sont dans un bateau..., Le Monde (15 Dec. 1980).
3. Oxford Reference, Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Law, https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/a_fortiori (accessed 1 May 2018).
4. Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a%20
fortiori (accessed 25 May 2018).
5. Josette Rey-Debove & Alain Rey, Le Petit Robert 2011, 66 (Le Robert 2010). ‘Inferring from the
truth of one proposition the truth of another one for which the given reason applies even better’.
(author’s translation).
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included in it or analogous to it, and which is less improbable, unusual or surprising,
must also exist’.6 In legal writing, a fortiori operates indeed like a logical inference: it
allows one to conclude that B is necessarily true simply because A has already been
ascertained to be true (e.g., If dolphin conservation falls under Article 65 UNCLOS
(Marine mammals), so is a fortiori the case of whales).
All these definitions and translations designate a fortiori as a compelling and
indefeasible logical argument. As a logical argument, a fortiori is meant to instil
universality and certainty to legal argumentation. However, before embracing the
virtues of legal logic, one should consider two obvious objections. As Chaïm Perelman
showed, argumentation and logic must be distinguished: legal arguments are meant to
convince an audience, not to establish an indisputable truth.7 Thus legal argumenta-
tion pertains more to the realm of rhetoric than to formal logic. Unsurprisingly, a
fortiori is more commonly used as a figure of speech – the final, fatal blow in a
disputation. The distance from a logical to a rhetorical argument is slim and the line is
quite often trespassed in argumentation, whether legal or not.
Furthermore, it is an argument of subsidiary importance, like many other
pseudo-logical arguments. Unlike interpretation in domestic law, interpretation in
international law follows an established method, due to its codification in Articles
31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As Panos Merkouris under-
lines, interpretation in international law ‘is regulated by rules, which to the degree
possible, ensure legal certainty, a main goal of legal science. It is no coincidence, that
all international courts and tribunals, either explicitly or implicitly follow the process of
treaty interpretation enshrined in Articles 31–33 of the VCLT’.8 In a perelmanian world,
the concept of legal science may appear overrated, but legal certainty is a shared goal.
The codification of the technique and method of interpretation by the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) serves this purpose well.
The drafters of the Convention made the deliberate choice of defining a standard
method, rather than compiling a catalogue of logico-legal maxims. Thus, the Special
Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock considered that the subject of treaty interpretation
6. Black’s Law Dictionary 5 (4th ed., West Publishing Company, 1968).
7. Robert Legros, Chaïm Perelman, in Nouvelle biographie nationale 293 (1997), t. IV: ‘The
fundamental idea behind Perelman’s doctrine is that legal logic, notably that applied by the judge,
does not get confused with formal logic. It is a specific logic. Law, and in particular the reasoning
of the judge, just like other social sciences, morals and philosophy, eludes formal logic because
it is not founded on certain truths. Law is not an exact science. The ultimate goal of legal science,
which is neither demonstrative nor purely rational but which seeks to convince with a view to
social peace through justice, is to end up with a reasonable solution, acceptable in the respect of
values, the first of which is justice (Translated from the French by Catherine Hall)’. Chaïm
Perlman’s major essays: Chaïm Perelman, De la Justice 83 (Office de publicité 1945); Chaïm
Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique 740
(Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles 6th ed., 2008); Chaïm Perelman, Logique juridique, nouvelle
rhétorique 193 (Dalloz 1976).
8. Panos Merkouris, Interpretation is a Science, Is an Art, Is a Science in, Treaty Interpretation and
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on 11 (M. Fitzmaurice & P. Merkouris eds,
Brill 2010).
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‘was a vast and difficult one and he was anxious not to penetrate too deeply into the
realm of logic’.9 Recourse to maxims appeared to him as aleatory and subjective:
[M]axims in international practice … are, for the most part, principles of logic and
good sense valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the
parties may have intended to attach to the expressions that they employed in a
document. Their suitability for use in any given case hinges on a variety of
considerations which have first to be appreciated by the interpreter of the
document. Even when a possible occasion for their application may appear to
exist, their application is not automatic but depends on the conviction of the
interpreter that it is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case. In other
words, recourse to many of these principles is discretionary rather than obliga-
tory.10
Thus, Sir Humphrey insisted upon the distinction between maxims, on the one
hand, and technique or methods of interpretation, on the other,11 and decided to codify
only the latter. ‘Unlike techniques [which relate to procedure rather than content],
maxims do not describe a structured way of arriving at the meaning of a text but
present standard arguments that have often been applied and, therefore, carry certain
relevance’.12 In practice, the codification of the technique has not ruled out maxims.
However, their importance in international jurisprudence has decreased and become
subsidiary.13 The study of case law shows indeed that maxims now normally come into
play after the interpreter has undergone the method of interpretation codified in Article
31 of the VCLT, either independently or integrated among the subsidiary means of
interpretation of Article 32 of the VCLT. In any case, their assigned role is generally to
confirm the meaning determined through the standard method.
Per argumentum a fortiori fits particularly well in this general landscape: it takes
the appearance of a logical, indefeasible argument, the modus operandi of which rests
upon a reinforced analogy (1.02). Despite its apparent simplicity and attractivity, it
9. International Law Commission, 726th Meeting: Law of Treaties, 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20, ¶ 4
(1964) (emphasis added).
10. Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 200, ¶ 5 (1964).
11. See ibid., p. 54, ¶ 5. The choice was not obvious to all the members of the ILC. Thus, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice was opposed to hard-and-fast rules telling tribunals how to read treaty provisions,
suggesting instead the listing of a code of principles or maxims that could possibly be relied on
by tribunals to justify their decisions. See Jan Klabbers, Virtuous Interpretation, in Treaty
Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on 1 (M. Fitzmaurice,
E. Olufemi & P. Merkouris eds, Nijhoff 2010). Sir Gerald identified six principles regularly used
by the PCIJ and by the ICJ: The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951–1954, 33 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 210–212 (1957).
12. Christian Djeffal, Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction
116–117 (Cambridge 2015).
13. This may be contrasted with the legal orders in which there is no codified method of
interpretation and logical canons of construction like a fortiori play an important role. Several
studies were indeed devoted to the use of a fortiori. For instance, in talmudical hermeneutics,
where the argument called Kal va-chomer, see inter alia Avi Sion, A Fortiori Logic: Innovations,
History and Assessments (The Logician 2013); Stefan Goltzberg, The A Fortiori Argument in the
Talmud, in Judaic Logic (Gorgias Press 2010); but also in Islamic jurisprudence – see Wael B.
Hallaq, Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunni Jurisprudence,
37(13) Arabica 315–358 (1990).
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plays a subsidiary role, proving to be in the end more an artifice of rhetoric, than an
operative maxim of interpretation (1.03).
§9.02 THE MODUS OPERANDI OF A FORTIORI
[A] A Fortiori Without Ratio Legis?
Two related operations stand at the basis of the argument a fortiori: an analogy and
then an implied inference. Like all analogies, a fortiori allows for a previous conclusion
to be automatically applied to a new legal situation/proposition. However, going
further in the analysis, legal theorists have stressed the fact that, beyond the mere
comparison, a fortiori relies upon a third element, the ratio legis (i.e., the reason or
principle behind a law) or the ratio decidendi (the principle, ground or reason for the
decision in a case, often a statement of law). This is the common reference, the hard
core present in both poles of comparison. As Chaïm Perelman underlined:
L’argumentum a fortiori s’appuie non pas sur la similitude du cas soumis au
tribunal avec un précédent approprié, mais sur la ratio decidendi, la raison alléguée
pour trancher le cas antérieur d’une façon déterminée. Il s’appuie de même sur
l’esprit de la loi. L’argument a fortiori prétend que la raison alléguée en faveur
d’une certaine conduite ou d’une certaine règle dans un cas déterminé s’impose
avec une force plus grande encore dans le cas actuel.14
The conclusion is obvious because the ratio legis applies with even greater force
to the second pole than to the first. A simple hypothetical example is: the treaty’s object
and purpose is to protect endangered species. If it interpreted to forbid the taking of
sperm whales, then it will a fortiori apply to blue whales, which are species menaced
with extinction.
The problem, however, is that the ratio legis is rarely stated in legal reasoning
where a fortiori comes into play and has to be separately identified. It is for the analyst
to uncover it in the demonstration. Some examples from international jurisprudence
illustrate this major difficulty with the argument a fortiori.
In its first contentious decision in the Wimbledon case, the Permanent Court of
International Justice had to determine whether Germany could, in order to implement
is laws on neutrality, forbid the passage through the Kiel Canal of neutral vessels
carrying contraband of war. Since neutrality rests upon the prohibition to side directly
or indirectly with a belligerent, Germany could have been under a duty to prohibit the
14. Chaïm Perelman, Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique 8 (Dalloz 1999) (first published: 1976).
In the same vein, see Robert Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international: esquisses
d’une herméneutique juridique moderne pour le droit international public 738 (Bruylant 2006).
Our translation of the quote from Perelman: The argumentum a fortiori does not rely on
the similarity of the case submitted to the tribunal with an appropriate precedent but on
the ratio decidendi, the reason alleged to settle the previous case in a given way. It also
relies on the spirit of the law. The argument a fortiori claims that the alleged reason in
favor of a certain behaviour or a certain rule in a given case establishes itself with an
even greater strength in the present case.
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passage of such ships through the Kiel Canal. Relying on Article 380 of the Treaty of
Versailles, which establishes a particular regime for the Canal, the Court held that this
provision:
lays down that the Kiel Canal shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of
commerce and war of all nations at peace with Germany [;] it is [thus] impossible
to allege that the terms of this article preclude, in the interests of the protection of
Germany’s neutrality, the transport of contraband of war … [I]t follows a fortiori
that the passage of neutral vessels carrying contraband of war is authorized by
Article 380, and cannot be imputed to Germany as a failure to fulfil its duties as a
neutral.15
The paragraph is hardly understandable on a quick reading. First, because the
concept ‘contraband of war’ is not defined. In 1927, its meaning may have seemed
obvious – it is much less so to the contemporary reader.16 Second, the PCIJ did not
identify the ratio legis of Article 380, which resulted from the specific intention of the
drafters of the Treaty to keep the Kiel Canal open to navigation in all circumstances and
for all ships, irrespective of their cargo. In the absence of these clarifications, the
Court’s reasoning is elliptic and the argument – to employ the maxim subject of this
chapter – a fortiori lacks persuasive force.
The PCIJ’s reasoning in the Turkey-Iraq (frontier) case is equally obscure, absent
the identification of the ratio legis. In this advisory opinion, the Court concluded that
the votes of the representatives of the interested Parties were not required to unani-
mously adopt a decision by the Council of the League of Nations establishing the
frontier between Turkey and Iraq. The Court relied on the exclusion of the votes of the
interested parties from the procedure for adopting binding recommendations (cf.
Article 15, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations) to extend this
conclusion to decisions adopted by the Council. The conclusion was reached despite
the fact that Article 5 of the Covenant clearly provided that ‘decisions … shall require
the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting’. The
Court’s conclusion rested upon the mechanical application of a fortiori:
It is hardly open to doubt that in no circumstances is it possible to be satisfied with
less than this conception of unanimity, for, if such unanimity is necessary in order
to endow a recommendation with the limited effects contemplated in paragraph 6
of Article 15 of the Covenant, it must a fortiori be so when a binding decision has
to be taken.17
Though dispositive for the Court’s conclusion, the argument is not persuasive.
First because the a minori ad majus18 is not of obvious application to authorizations: in
the present case, its application leads to the illogical conclusion that if the Council
15. S.S. ‘Wimbledon’, Judgment (17 Aug. 1923), PCIJ Series A, No. 1, pp. 29–30.
16. According to the definition in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: ‘Contraband, in the laws of war –
goods that may not be shipped to a belligerent because they serve a military purpose’.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/contraband (accessed 7 May 2018).
17. Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (frontier between Turkey and Iraq), Advisory
Opinion (21 Nov. 1925), PCIJ Series B, No. 12, p. 32.
18. On the difference between a minori ad majus and a majori ad minus, see infra, sub-section B.
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could adopt recommendations without the vote of the interested parties, it could also
adopt decisions under the same circumstances. Yet, this is illogical: the conditions for
adopting binding decisions are generally more stringent than those set out for adopting
recommendations. Second, the procedure for adopting decisions is specifically referred
to in Article 5, which requires full unanimity. Thus, the Court’s use of a fortiori is not
compelling. This being said, it is not because the reasoning is not persuasive that the
conclusion is necessarily wrong. In fact, the Court applied the proper lex specialis,
according to the subject-matter of the texts adopted. It considered that the settlement
of disputes was addressed by Article 10, and therein the rule of unanimity was
understood as excluding the votes of the interested Parties. It mattered little whether
the instruments adopted by the Council were called decisions or recommendations,
since even the latter had binding effects towards the members. The decision establish-
ing the frontier between Turkey and Iraq was one settling the dispute between those
two parties. Article 10 was then the proper rule to be applied in this circumstance.
The decisions of the Franco-Italian Commission of Conciliation established by the
1947 Treaty of Peace are emblematic both for their extensive recourse to logical
maxims and for their difficult apprehension. The Commission had to determine
whether the former African colonies of Italy, as well as Albania and Ethiopia, were
among the ‘transferred or ceded territories [in French: territoires cédés]’ within the
meaning of the Peace Treaty. The term was not defined in the Treaty, but the
Commission held that it referred to the territories the sovereignty of which was
transferred from Italy to the Allies and Associated Powers. The Commission held that:
si l’article 21, par. 4, dispose expressis verbis que ‘le Territoire Libre de Trieste ne
sera pas considéré comme territoire cédé, au sens de l’article 19…’, cela n’autorise
pas une argumentation a contrario, c’est-à-dire la conclusion que l’Ethiopie,
l’Albanie et les anciennes possessions italiennes en Afrique devront être considérées
comme territoires cédés, mais bien plutôt une argumentation a fortiori: si même le
Territoire Libre de Trieste ne doit pas être considéré comme territoire cédé, à plus
forte raison cela vaut-il pour l’Ethiopie, l’Albanie et les possessions territoriales
italiennes en Afrique. Il y a lieu de rappeler, en effet, que la notion technique ou
propre de cession de territoire dans le Traité correspond assez exactement au sens
qu’attribue à ces mots le droit international public. La doctrine moderne décom-
pose, en effet, ordinairement l’opération de la cession en deux actes successifs:
l’abandon par l’Etat cédant de sa compétence territoriale étant suivi de
l’établissement de la sienne par l’Etat annexant ou cessionnaire … Les deux actes
se retrouvent dans les opérations stipulées aux articles 6, 11 et 14 du Traité. Le
second acte, en tout cas, fait par contre défaut dans les opérations visées … Quant
à la mention expresse (art. 21, par. 4, du Traité) que les dispositions économiques
et financières de l’Annexe XIV ne sont pas applicables au Territoire Libre de Trieste,
pour lequel les dispositions économiques et financières sont établies par l’Annexe X,
c’est l’argument a fortiori et non celui a contrario qui s’impose en ce qui concerne
l’Ethiopie, l’Albanie et les possessions italiennes en Afrique, cela pour des raisons
analogues à celles qui ont été développées plus haut au sujet de la portée territoriale
de l’article 19.19
19. Author’s translation:
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The Commission had recourse to a panoply of logical inferences. It first rejected
the argument a contrario: the Treaty expressly identified the Free Territory of Trieste as
a non-ceded territory, yet that did not mean that all the other territories to which Italy
renounced were ipso facto ceded territories. The argument a contrario was thus
inoperant. The Commission then relied on the argument a fortiori to conclude that the
former colonies Ethiopia and Albania could not be among the ceded territories. The
argument plays an essential role in the Commission’s reasoning, but it can only be
understood if the underlying ratio legis is identified. Yet this one is hidden in a mass of
literal and contextual arguments. Relying on doctrinal definitions, the Commission
underlines that the ceded territories are those to which one State renounced sover-
eignty in order to transfer it to another. If the Peace Treaty deprives Italy of its
sovereignty over the former colonies, it does not actually transfer it to another State or
another entity. The argument a fortiori comes into play through a comparison with the
status of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT): if the Parties organized a special regime of
co-sovereignty for the FTT, excluding it from the generic category of ceded territories,
they must also have intended to exclude the former colonies, for which no regime of
transfer of sovereignty had been established. The reasoning may be debated, but the
conclusion seems supported by a contextual interpretation. In any event, even if the
Commission presents it as the obvious outcome of logical reasoning, its conclusion
does not flow easily from the application of a contrario and a fortiori – indeed, the
extensive quote above is more confusing than illuminating.
By contrast, when the ratio legis is clearly identified, the reasoning is also clear.
The treatment of additional claims by the ICJ is topical. The Court declares them
inadmissible because their acceptance would constitute a departure from the condition
set out in Article 40 of the Statute, according to which the Application must indicate the
subject of the dispute. New claims could thus transform the subject-matter of the
If Article 21 para. 4 expressly provides that ‘the Free Territory of Triste will not be
considered as ceded territory within the meaning of Article 19…’, this doesn’t allow a
reasoning a contrario, according to which Ethiopia, Albania and the former possessions
of Italy in Africa should be considered as ceded territories, but rather an argumentum a
fortiori: if the Free Territory of Trieste cannot be considered as a ceded territory, this
applies to even greater force to Ethiopia, Albania and the Italian territorial possessions
in Africa. It is important to note in this respect that the technical or specific concept of
cession of territory in the Treaty corresponds quite exactly to the meaning given to these
words in public international law. Modern doctrine usually breaks down the cession
operation in two consecutive acts: the abandonment of sovereignty over the territory by
the ceding State followed by the establishment of its sovereignty by the annexing or
transferee State … Both acts can be found in the operations provided for in articles 6, 11
and 14 of the Treaty. By contrast, the second act is absent from the targeted operations
… Regarding the express stipulation (art. 21, par. 4 of the Treaty) according to which the
economic and financial provisions of Annex XIX are not applicable to the Free Territory
of Trieste, for which specific economic and financial regulations are established by
Annex X, again it is the argument a fortiori instead of a contrario which becomes
applicable with regard to Ethiopia, Albania and the Italian possessions in Africa, for
reasons similar to the one developed above concerning the territorial scope of article 19.
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dispute, which can be problematic for many reasons (for instance, if consent to
jurisdiction is limited ratione materiae). The later the claim is introduced the fewer are
its chances to be admissible. Logically, if a new claim introduced in the Memorial is in
general inadmissible, such is a fortiori the case for a later one, introduced in the
Rejoinder or the oral hearings:
the Court has concluded that additional claims formulated in the course of
proceedings are inadmissible if they would result, were they to be entertained, in
transforming ‘the subject of the dispute originally brought before [the Court] under
the terms of the Application’ … In this respect, it is the Application which is
relevant and the Memorial, ‘though it may elucidate the terms of the Application,
must not go beyond the limits of the claim as set out therein’ … A fortiori, a claim
formulated subsequent to the Memorial, as is the case here, cannot transform the
subject of the dispute as delimited by the terms of the Application.20
This example thus demonstrates that once the ratio legis is clearly articulated, the
conclusion flowing from a fortiori reasoning becomes obvious. The challenge is that in
most cases the ratio legis is left unspecified. This makes reasoning a fortiori frustrat-
ingly obscure. This is true both in international law and in domestic law. Luis Duarte
d’Almeida reached the same conclusion in his article analysing the use of a fortiori by
UK judges:
Perhaps the most notable feature of a fortiori arguments is that very often an
arguer who offers an argument of that kind will leave almost every essential
component of the inference unstated. The crucial elements of the argument—the
premises on which the arguer is relying, or needs to be relying in order for the
inference to run—are typically omitted, if not concealed, in what an arguer
actually says or writes. This may lend a fortiori arguments considerable rhetorical
strength. But it makes it all the more difficult to assess whether the argument being
given really is a good one.21
20. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits,
Judgment (30 Nov. 2010), ICJ Reports 2010, p. 639, ¶ 39. In the same vein:
It is well established in the Court’s jurisprudence that the parties to a case cannot in the
course of proceedings ‘transform the dispute brought before the Court into a dispute
that would be of a different nature’ … In other words: ‘the liberty accorded to the
parties to amend their submissions up to the end of the oral proceedings must be
construed reasonably and without infringing the terms of Article 40 of the Statute and
Article 32, paragraph 2, of the [1936] Rules which provide that the Application must
indicate the subject of the dispute’ … A fortiori, the same applies to the case of
counter-claims, having regard to the provisions of Article 80 of the Rules of Court, and
in particular taking into account the fact that it is on the basis of the counter-claim as
originally submitted that the Court determines whether it is ‘directly connected with the
subject-matter of the claim’, and as such admissible under that text.
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment (6 Nov.
2003), ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161, ¶ 117 (emphasis added).
21. Luís Duarte d’Almeida, Arguing a fortiori, 80(2) Modern L. Rev. 202–237 (2017).
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[B] The Two Versions of a Fortiori: A Majori ad Minus and a Minori ad
Majus
As an analogy, the argument a fortiori rests upon the comparison between two
concepts/situations/legal concepts/legal propositions. It is usually situated alongside a
pari or a simili (in a similar situation), it being understood that it is a reinforced
analogy.22 As such, its use should lead the audience to the inescapable conclusion that
the same solution applies to the latter as to the former proposition. The argument a
fortiori is usually subdivided in two branches, a majori ad minus (from bigger to
smaller)23 and the reverse, a minori ad majus (an inference from smaller to bigger).24
International jurisprudence contains uses of both figures. Applying an a minori
ad majus reasoning, in the Legal status of Eastern Greenland, the PCIJ first concluded
that the Ihlen declaration was binding upon Norway and, as a result, that Norway had
to recognize Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. From this legal assertion, the
Court triggered two consequences: Norway was under ‘an obligation to refrain from
contesting Danish sovereignty over Greenland as a whole, and a fortiori to refrain from
occupying a part of Greenland’.25
To take another example, in the Factory at Chorzów, the PCIJ held that ‘if
expropriation in consideration of an indemnity is prohibited …, a fortiori is a seizure,
without compensation to the interested Parties, prohibited’.26 Finally, in Kasikili
Sedudu Island, the Court concluded that:
the … events, which occurred between 1947 and 1951, demonstrate the absence of
agreement between South Africa and Bechuanaland with regard to the location of
the boundary around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the status of the Island. Those
events cannot therefore constitute ‘subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty [of 1890] which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation’ (1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31, para. 3
(b)). A fortiori, they cannot have given rise to an ‘agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ (ibid.,
Art. 31, para. 3 (a)).27
Of course, once the Court qualified a factual situation as a non-agreement, it
excluded it from the scope of all provisions which refer to agreements, either informal
or formal.
22. Stefan Goltzberg, Théorie bidimensionnelle de l’argumentation juridique 72 (Primento Digital
2013).
23. In French, ‘qui peut le plus peut le moins’.
24. In French, ‘qui ne peut pas le moins ne peut pas le plus’.
25. Legal status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment (5 Apr. 1933), PCIJ Series
A/B, No. 53, p. 55 (emphasis added).
26. Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), Judgment (26 Jul. 1927), PCIJ Series A, No. 9, p. 31.
27. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment (13 Dec. 1999), ICJ Reports 1999, p.
1045, ¶ 63 (emphasis added); other examples of the use of ad minori ad majus: Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment (27 Jun. 1986), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, ¶ 110; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (20 Apr. 2010), ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14, ¶ 144.
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In all these cases, the Court determined the scope and effects of a legal rule by an
automatic application of the argument a fortiori. Its persuasiveness comes from the
conjunction of two elements: first, the applicable legal principle and their ratio legis are
clearly identified; second, the particular consequences triggered by the Court pertain to
the same categories, which makes the analogy all the more plausible. At the same time,
the use of the argument a fortiori is purely rhetorical and adds nothing to the
demonstration. As will be seen below, a fortiori is a shortcut for argumentation rather
than a maxim of interpretation.28
The argument a majori ad minus is less often employed, but is not completely
absent from the case law. It may serve to determine the scope of a prohibition, like for
the contraband of war in the Wimbledon case.29 The European courts employ this form
more frequently, in particular when they are called to determine the scope of
authorizations granted to States or to EU institutions.30 To take just one example, the
ECHR considered that States enjoy a large margin of appreciation to implement social
and economic policies, and that this liberty is all the more important when these
policies are meant to redress the consequences of a regime which is incompatible with
the liberal approach of the Convention (typically, the communist regimes in Eastern
Europe):
37. The enactment of laws providing for rehabilitation, restitution of confiscated
property or compensation for such property obviously involved comprehensive
consideration of manifold issues of a moral, legal, political and economic nature.
In a different context, the Court has held that the national authorities of the
Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the existence of
a problem of public concern warranting specific measures and in implementing
social and economic policies …
38. A similar approach is a fortiori relevant as regards rehabilitation and restitution
laws adopted in the above context, such as the 1991 Act.31
Of course, it is not always easy to make the distinction between the two versions
of a fortiori. This logical confusion may be illustrated by the Barbados v. Republic of
28. See infra §9.03[A].
29. See also supra §9.02[A].
30. For ECJ cases, see: Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner & Digital Rights
Ireland Ltd., CJEU Case No. C-362/14, Judgment (6 Oct. 2015), ¶ 62; Lighting Poland SA &
Philips Lighting BV v. Council of the European Union, Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co., Ltd,
GE Hungary Ipari és Kereskedelmi Zrt. (GE Hungary Zrt.), Osram GmbH, European Commission,
CJEU Case No. C-511/13 P, Judgment (8 Sep. 2015), ¶ 55.
31. Kopecky v. Slovakia, ECtHR App. No. 44912/98, Judgment (28 Sept. 2004), ¶¶ 37–38. Yet, in this
case, the ECHR seemed to consider that the argument a fortiori was not self-sufficient. It thus
added another argument, concerning the application ratione temporis of the Convention:
[T]he Court reiterates that the Convention imposes no specific obligation on the
Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to their
ratification of the Convention. Similarly, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be
interpreted as restricting the freedom of the Contracting States to choose the conditions
under which they agree to return property which had been transferred to them before
they ratified the Convention.
Ibid., ¶ 38.
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Trinidad and Tobago award, where the tribunal considered that if the parties could not
agree on the legal principles applicable to delimitation, they could not have reached an
agreement on the delimitation line through application of those principles:
The fact that the precise scope of the dispute had not been fully articulated or
clearly depicted does not preclude the existence of a dispute, so long as the record
indicates with reasonable clarity the scope of the legal differences between the
Parties. The fact that in this particular case the Parties could not even agree upon the
applicable legal rules shows that a fortiori they could not agree on any particular
line which might follow from the application of appropriate rules. Accordingly, to
insist upon a specific line having been tabled by each side in the negotiations
would be unrealistic and formalistic. In the present case the record of the Parties’
negotiations shows with sufficient clarity that their dispute covered the legal bases
on which a delimitation line should be drawn in accordance with international
law, and consequently the actual drawing of that line32
The Tribunal seems to apply here the a minori ad majus argument. Yet, to States,
the delimitation line is more important than the legal principles applicable to delimi-
tation, of which they can dispose. In negotiations, States rarely follow any established
method of delimitation. Maritime delimitation negotiations are frequently influenced
by extra-legal considerations – political, historical, economic, and so on. The Tribu-
nal’s misleading application of the argument a fortiori led it to conclude that the Parties
did not need to have clearly articulated their claims during negotiations. But this is
problematic not only for determining the scope of the dispute, but also the area in
dispute, to which a particular regime applies as per Articles 74-3 and 83-3 of UNCLOS.
§9.03 THE FUNCTIONS OF PER ARGUMENTUM A FORTIORI
International jurisprudence shows that argumentum a fortiori has lost its once disposi-
tive role in interpretation and become a shortcut in reasoning, or a rhetorical argument,
meant to put the demonstration beyond any contestation. This apparent devolution
from an operative to a merely subsidiary argument is concomitant with and essentially
due to the codification of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.33
[A] A Fortiori, in Between Ockham’s Razor and the Principle of Legal
Security
Ockham’s Razor principle, named after the fourteenth century logician and Franciscan
friar William of Ockham, postulates that ‘entities should not be multiplied unneces-
sarily’. It is sometimes identified as the law of parsimony or economy, and stands for
the proposition that scientists or, as a matter of fact, lawyers must use the simplest
means for arriving at their results. The ICJ often applies this principle of economy of
32. Maritime Boundary Delimitation (Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago), PCA Case No. 2004-02,
Award (11 Apr. 2006), ¶ 198 (emphasis added).
33. See supra §9.01.
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means, either when it chooses one of the possible legal rules applicable to the case
submitted to it, or the arguments to put forward in justification of its decisions. In this
context, the argument a fortiori is a shortcut to avoid deploying all over again a legal
demonstration made elsewhere. It leads to the automatic adoption of a conclusion
already reached (either in the same judgment, or in a precedent one).34 Sometimes, the
use of a fortiori allows the Court to avoid answering some of the arguments made by
the Parties.
Some topical examples serve to illustrate the use of a fortiori as a demonstrative
shortcut. Thus, in the Genocide case, the Court had established in its 1996 judgment on
preliminary objections that Serbia andMontenegro (formerly Yugoslavia) had access to
the court and was also a party to the Genocide Convention. However, while the 1996
judgment dealt specifically with the former Yugoslavia’s participation in the Conven-
tion, it was not expressly addressing its status as a member of the United Nations. Since
the Court concluded that the latter issue, and thus Serbia’s standing, had been
impliedly determined in 1996 with res judicata force, it was bound to adopt the same
conclusion in relation to the quality of a Party to the Genocide Convention:
140. The Court accordingly concludes that, in respect of the contention that the
Respondent was not, on the date of filing of the Application instituting proceed-
ings, a State having the capacity to come before the Court under the Statute, the
principle of res judicata precludes any reopening of the decision embodied in the
1996 Judgment. The Respondent has however also argued that the 1996 Judgment
is not res judicata as to the further question whether the FRY was, at the time of
institution of proceedings, a party to the Genocide Convention, and has sought to
show that at that time it was not, and could not have been, such a party. The Court
however considers that the reasons given above for holding that the 1996 Judgment
settles the question of jurisdiction in this case with the force of res judicata are
applicable a fortiori as regards this contention, since on this point the 1996
Judgment was quite specific, as it was not on the question of capacity to come before
the Court.35
The issue being settled with res judicata force, the Court no longer needed to
address other admissibility arguments made by Bosnia, like forum prorogatum or
estoppel, which would require a full demonstration, but would in any case have led to
the same conclusion, that the Court’s jurisdiction was an issue definitively established:
The Court does not therefore find it necessary to examine the argument of the
Applicant that the failure of the Respondent to advance at the time the reasons why
34. The role of the precedent is, at least in part, to ‘délester le juge d’une partie de sa fonction, en lui
permettant de se reposer sur une solution déjà adoptée en la transposant à une autre affaire.
Considérée de cette manière, le précédent est un ‘raccourci’ qu’emprunte le juge: au lieu d’avoir
à se reposer une question déjà tranchée, il tint pour acquis le résultat du raisonnement’. (Mathias
Forteau, Les décisions juridictionnelles comme précédent, in Le précédent en droit international
108 (Pedone 2016)).
35. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment (26 Feb. 2007), ICJ Reports
2007, pp. 101–102, ¶ 140 (emphasis added).
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it now contends that it was not a party to the Genocide Convention might raise
considerations of estoppel, or forum prorogatum.36
In maritime delimitation, one of the questions repetitively raised before the ICJ
concerns the effect of insular features on the delimitation line. Without following a
general principle, the Court takes into account the general configuration of the coast
and the geographical situation of the insular feature, as well as its size. But in the
absence of general, established criteria, the Court may compare one feature with others
it had to consider in previous cases:
In the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, for example, the Court held that
it was inappropriate to select any base point on Serpents’ Island (which, at 0.17
square km was very much larger than the part of Quitasueño which is above water
at high tide), because it lay alone and at a distance of some 20 nautical miles from
the mainland coast of Ukraine, and its use as a part of the relevant coast ‘would
amount to grafting an extraneous element onto Ukraine’s coastline; the conse-
quence would be a judicial refashioning of geography, which neither the law nor
practice of maritime delimitation authorizes’ (Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 110, para. 149). These
considerations apply with even greater [in French, a fortiori] force to Quitasueño.
In addition to being a tiny feature, it is 38 nautical miles from Santa Catalina and
its use in the construction of the provisional median line would push that line
significantly closer to Nicaragua.37
One may think that the Court’s reference to a previous solution illustrates its
concern with treating equally similar situations. But if one looks at the bigger picture,
one realizes that there is nothing systematic in the reference to solutions reached in the
previous cases. For instance, in the case concerning the Maritime delimitation in the
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the Court
made no reference either to Serpents Island or to Quitasueño, even though there were
some tiny insular features, such as the Palmenta Cays (islets lying at a distance of about
one nautical mile from the Nicaraguan coast)38 and the Paxaro Bovo (a rock situated 3
nautical miles off the coast south of Punta del Mono),39 whose effect on delimitation
needed to be addressed.
The international system is not one of binding precedent. The very reference to a
prior decision and the choice of one particular precedent to the exclusion of others are
thus decisions entirely within the Court’s margin of discretion. When they occur, they
are justified either by the parties’ heavy reliance upon them in their pleadings or, more
often, by the Court’s intention to reinforce the persuasiveness of its conclusions. It is
then clear that the a fortiori reference to a precedent is less a translation of the
imperative of legal security and more a rhetorical artifice used by the judge.
36. Ibid.
37. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment (19 Nov. 2012), ICJ
Reports 2012, p. 624, at p. 699, ¶ 202.
38. Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Judgement (2 Feb. 2018), ICJ Reports 2018, ¶ 142.
39. Ibid.
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[B] A Fortiori, a Rhetorical, Indefeasible Argument
Per argumentum a fortiori is an artifice of rhetoric rather than a tool of interpretation.
Before the method of interpretation was codified in the Vienna Convention, legal
maxims played an important role in legal argumentation. Per argumentum a fortiori
was even decisive in some of the PCIJ’s judgments.40 At present, it only plays a
subsidiary role, and the argumentation could withstand scrutiny even if the a fortiori
argument were not invoked. It is precisely its subsidiarity that reveals the rhetorical
force of the argument a fortiori. The aim of rhetoric being to persuade through
discourse,41 the reasonable accumulation of arguments and their proper selection serve
this rhetorical aim. Among different rhetorical artifices, a fortiori has a particular
strength due to its claim to irrefutability. As Robert Kolb stressed, ‘[l]’argument tend à
frapper l’esprit parce que ce qu’il postule confine à l’évidence’.42
Yet, this purported irrefutability may also be a pitfall for legal reasoning. What
appears to be a deductively valid argument may prove in the end to be founded on a
misleading presumption. Some of the examples above, where the use of a fortiori was
either criticized or unclear,43 stand proof that, in legal demonstration, there is no
indefeasible argument. Another warning may come for instance from an older case of
the ECHR, where it rejected any automatic application of a majori ad minus and
warned against the temptation to draw simplistic logical consequences:
[I]n the area of human rights he who can do more cannot necessarily do less. The
Convention permits under certain conditions some very serious forms of treat-
ments, such as the death penalty (article 2(1), second sentence), whilst at the same
time prohibiting others which by comparison can be regarded as rather mild, for
example ‘unlawful’ detention for a brief period (Article 5(1)) or the expulsion of a
national (Article 3(1) of Protocol No. 4). The fact that it is possible to inflict on a
person one of the first-mentioned forms of treatment cannot authorise his being
subjected to one of the second-mentioned …44
A fortiori shows that formal logic and legal argumentation do not necessarily go
hand in hand, and the lawyer should not succumb to the facility of deceptively simple
arguments. To take up Christian Djeffal’s conclusions: ‘An interpreter using maxims
will build upon their “deceptive elegance and simplicity” … Maxims pretend to be
derived from legal logic … Yet, like rhetorical figures, they depend upon their
suitability in the specific context, and they do not derive from logical imperatives’.45
40. See supra the PCIJ decisions quoted in §9.02[A]; but also Trinidad/Barbados award, in §9.02[B].
41. According to Aristotle’s famous definition, ‘rhetoric is the ability to see what is possibly
persuasive in every given case’. (Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1355b26f-7). See also Chaïm Perelman,
Logique juridique, nouvelle rhétorique 105 (Dalloz 1976).
42. Kolb, supra n.14, at 739 (author’s translation: ‘the argument is striking because it purports to
state the obvious’.). See also d’Almeida, supra n.21, at 232.
43. See supra, §9.02[A].
44. Deweer v. Belgium, ECtHR App. No. 6903/75, Judgment (27 Feb. 1980), ¶ 53 (emphasis added).
45. Christian Djeffal, Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction 116,
117 (Cambridge 2016).
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